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Over the past 25 years, the National Committee on United States-China Relations (National 
Committee) has written five survey-based reports that provide an overview and analysis of 
China-related international relations and security issues at American academic centers, think 
tanks, and NGOs. They were conducted at the behest of U.S. foundations and remained internal 
documents. Believing that these reports would be useful to a wider community, the National 
Committee is very pleased that a shortened and anonymized version of the latest of these 
reports, American International Relations and Security Programs Focused on China: A Survey of 
the Field, is being published by Carnegie Corporation of New York.  
 
Naturally, each report is a snapshot of a specific moment in time, capturing the thoughts and 
attitudes of the respondents — specialists and scholars in the complex field of China studies. 
Although this latest report is being published in August 2021, the survey on which it is based 
was taken in December 2020 and is very much “of its moment” — during the final days of the 
Trump administration and an ongoing pandemic.  
 
Like its predecessors, this report can be used to understand the current state of the field; to 
make some educated guesses about the future of China studies; to inform scholarship, public 
policy decisions, and the general public’s desire to know more about China; and to pinpoint the 
gaps in the field that need to be overcome.  
 
A terrific National Committee team worked on this project: Senior Program Officer Rosie Levine 
did an extraordinary job of conceptualizing the plan and managing the process; Johanna 
Costigan, a freelance writer (and former National Committee intern) provided superb writing 
skills, mastery of the subject matter, and the wonderful ability to keep calm in the face of three 
very tough editors; Program Assistant Jason Togut did a great job helping determine the 
institutions and individuals we would survey, as well as figuring out how to best capture the data 
in graphic form; Deputy Vice President Margot Landman’s excellent editing skills contributed to 
a better final product; and Senior Operations Manager Carly Biondi and Program Operations 
Manager Alex Guido were extremely helpful in building the report’s architecture and technical 
structure. Huge thanks and kudos to all.  
 
Our thanks also go to Carnegie Corporation of New York for its faith in the National Committee 
and for entrusting us with this project. Lastly, our deep appreciation to the survey respondents 
who took the time to reflect so thoughtfully and honestly on their current work and the future of 
the relationship.  
 
Jan Berris  
Vice President  







In December 2020, the National Committee on United States-China Relations (NCUSCR) 
received responses from 82 think tanks, academic centers, and NGOs to a survey commissioned 
by Carnegie Corporation of New York assessing the state of China-related international 
relations and peace and security programs in the United States. The results present a snapshot 
of the field in an era of global disruption, instability, and growing Sino-American tensions, when 
the surveyed organizations have critical roles to play in increasing expert, policy-level, and 
public understanding of the bilateral relationship and its broader implications.  
  
At the time the survey was conducted, the COVID-19 pandemic had killed over 1.4 million people 
and the U.S.-China relationship, already deteriorating for years, had worsened as each 
government blamed the other for its poor response to the coronavirus. In addition to the 
Chinese government’s actions in the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, tensions over 
trade and pandemic management prompted a growing bipartisan, anti-China turn in U.S. policy 
and rhetoric. 
 
The rapid downward spiral of U.S.-China relations has politicized the field, limited scholars’ 
ability to conduct productive research, and contributed to the rise of anti-Asian racism in the 
United States. The hawkish dominant narratives on China have made it more difficult for people 
to express balanced views lest they be labeled excessively pro-China. At the same time, in the 
wake of the arbitrary detentions of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor (Canadian citizens who 
have been in Chinese detention since December 2018), some respondents expressed concern 
for their own safety in China. 
 
Survey responses make clear the U.S.-China relationship has experienced structural shifts that 
no single policy change or executive order can undo. Scholars and practitioners will have to find 
ways to navigate increasingly hostile environments in and between both countries, effectively 
manage risks, and endure increased pressure and scrutiny on their output. As American focus 
on China continues to expand, however, U.S.-based China-focused scholars and practitioners 
face increasing opportunities, challenges, and responsibilities. 
 
Key Finding 1: Demand for China content is growing in the United States, leading to an 
increase in opportunities for think tanks, programmatic institutions, and academia, along 
with a shift toward more public-facing work in the latter community. 
  
Key Finding 2: In China, domestic tightening has limited information flows, including access 
to data and the ability to conduct in-country research and interact with Chinese counterparts 
safely and effectively, influencing the topics that can be addressed productively. 
  
Key Finding 3: While often in response to specific Chinese actions and policies, the Trump 
administration’s management of the relationship placed American foreign policy institutions 
and individual scholars focused on China in the crossfire, limiting their ability to successfully 
conduct research and programming.  
  
Key Finding 4: The downturn in the bilateral relationship has politicized work on China and 
constrained organizations by severely polarizing discussion of China and Sino-American 
relations, resulting in a diminution of the quality of the discourse in both countries.  
  
Key Finding 5: In the current U.S. geopolitical environment, many China-related topics are 
viewed through the lens of security, both within and outside academia. As a result, China has 
often been reduced to a target in U.S. domestic rhetoric, rather than a complex subject of 





Respondents also reported other challenges, both individually and writ large, including financial 
limitations, navigating a limited number of funders with a range of priorities, a glaring lack of 
diversity among practitioners in the China studies space, and the “pipeline issue” of providing 
opportunities that keep students involved in China studies. Despite these obstacles, the 
respondents also underscored the continued value of conducting cutting-edge research, 
training the next generation of foreign policy professionals, and providing insights in digestible 
ways to broad audiences. They also identified major research gaps on the frontiers of the field, 
such as: 
  
Emerging Technologies, including the role of artificial intelligence, effects on cybersecurity, 
Chinese science and technology policy, and the implications of technological decoupling 
and/or localization. 
  
China’s International Economic Engagement and its continuing trade expansion, U.S.-
Chinese economic interdependence and interests, the stability of the global economy, and 
the role of the economy as a tool of Chinese statecraft. 
  
Data Access and the ability to analyze original Chinese-language documents, datasets, 
articles, commentary, and speeches, as well as the need for open-source translation of 
these documents for foreign policy analysts not fluent in Mandarin Chinese. 
  
Nontraditional Security Studies such as environmental security, public health, and human 
rights, which are too siloed and require better integration in U.S. foreign policy and peace 
and security conversations. 
  
Understanding China’s Political Intentions, both internationally through efforts to “export” 
its model and shape international regimes, and domestically as viewed through Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) dynamics and decision-making under President Xi; China’s bilateral 
relations with countries other than the United States, especially Russia and India.  
  
Other areas needing attention include nuanced study of Chinese ethnic minority communities 
and governance, a “return to Sinology” (revival of area studies), research into the CCP’s 
approach to diplomacy beyond military-to-military relations, and training on how to manage 
risks introduced by an increasingly repressive Chinese government.  
  
The key findings and identified research gaps reflected in this report paint a picture of 
heightened interest in advancing understanding of, and between, the United States and China, 
amid a challenging environment of geopolitical tension with spillover effects on China-related 
research, analysis, and programming. Above all, they also underscore the critical need for 
persisting in these efforts given the stakes involved in the most consequential geostrategic 







At the request of Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY), the National Committee on United 
States-China Relations (National Committee) has produced a report covering China-related 
international relations and peace and security programs in the United States. It is intended to 
assist the Corporation in understanding the current state of the field, summarizing the 
geopolitical developments that have shaped the field in recent years, and pinpointing important 
gaps in research. The National Committee sent a survey to 125 institutions in December 2020; 
this report is based on the 82 responses1 that were received, in addition to comments from 53 
China experts contacted during the initial stages of research, and feedback from three 
reviewers.2   
 
In addition to a needs assessment for the Corporation, the report provides an evaluation of the 
primary challenges faced by American China-focused programs since the last time the National 
Committee conducted a somewhat similar report about 10 years ago.3 In the intervening period, 
geopolitical developments in and between Beijing and Washington, D.C., have affected the work 
of U.S.-based China scholars and institutions. China’s rapid military modernization, 
technological advances, and meteoric economic growth (often subsumed under the 
omnipresent term “China’s rise”) are perceived as an existential threat by some who are wary 
of China’s role on the global stage. Other analyses tend to focus on specific areas of concern: 
the CCP’s coercive legislation and actions in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, more aggressive foreign 
policy, adoption of an international NGO law that constrains various exchange activities, and 
greater restrictions for Chinese and foreigners on many forms of research, intellectual 
exchange, and public discourse.   
 
On the American side, the last decade has also seen the development of an increasingly 
adversarial stance toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The souring in the relationship 
is in part the product of bipartisan hawkishness on China policy; it both preceded and 
transcends the Trump administration. As one reviewer wrote, “There is general consensus that 
the relationship was already trending downward before he took office, and got worse as both 
sides failed to take steps to reconcile their differences.” Under the Trump administration, this 
was manifested through a trade war, the Justice Department’s China Initiative targeting 
Chinese researchers and academics, increased anti-Chinese racism, and the elimination of the 
Peace Corps and Fulbright China programs. 
 
Both countries have engaged in a tit-for-tat race to the bottom — evident in maneuvers such as 
restrictive visa policies and the sudden closing of the Chinese Consulate in Houston leading to 
the closing of the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu. These factors, along with several others, have 
contributed to creating a changed landscape for those who work in the realm of China studies 
and peace and security.  
 
 
1 The full list of organizations that responded to the survey may be found in the appendix. 
2 All three reviewers also filled out the survey on behalf of the programs they oversee, and are thus also included in 
the 82 respondents.  
3 “American China-focused programs” were defined as academic and other not-for-profit organizations based or 
headquartered in the United States with a “critical mass” of specialists or programming relevant to the topics of this 
report. Programs or institutions with occasional programming/research or only one or two researchers focusing on 






To ensure that we captured both established institutions and those new to the field, we re-
assessed the list of organizations we had previously surveyed, adding important organizations 
that have emerged in the past decade and eliminating those that no longer exist. We then 
consulted a wide range of scholars and specialists in relevant fields to identify organizations we 
may have missed. This outreach targeted both senior China hands as well as emerging voices. 
We utilized a working definition of “security” that goes beyond the traditional foreign policy 
parameters and includes transnational issues such as climate change, technology, public 
health, and human rights — thus expanding the types and number of institutions contacted. To 
ensure a comprehensive list, we talked with a few key scholars in each of these fields about 
which organizations to include. The institutions surveyed are diverse not only in the type of work 
they do, but also in their structure (e.g., stand-alone institutions, part of a parent organization, 
independent but embedded within another organization) and funding mechanisms.   
 
Biases and Limitations 
  
Established in 1966, the National Committee has played a key unofficial role in the Sino-
American bilateral relationship and in convening China-focused organizations throughout the 
United States. Our solid understanding of U.S.-China relations and personal connections to 
leading individuals in the field were strong assets in the survey process. However, given our 
history and long relationships with the more established institutions, the National Committee 
also has an unavoidable bias toward these groups, reflected, for example, in our background 
knowledge of ongoing programs or research, and in our ability to send personalized reminders 
and conduct detailed follow-up.  
 
One major challenge in writing the survey questions was the unique set of circumstances all 
organizations faced in December 2020 as a result of COVID-19. We attempted to separate 
pandemic-related issues from organizations’ regular work by devoting one section to a series of 
questions focused solely on the impact of COVID-19. The aim of isolating these effects from 
other challenges or opportunities was to prompt respondents to think beyond the time frame 
when their work would be directly affected by the pandemic. For many, however, imagining a 
future after the pandemic was not easy.  
 
The results make clear that COVID-19 affected organizations differently; those surveyed 
indicated a range in both the degree of impact and the extent to which the pandemic will 
continue to affect their work. Since the goal of the survey was to gain an understanding of the 
typical practices of each organization, we tried our best to prevent the fact that we were 
gathering information at a very atypical time from becoming an obstacle. However, 
disentangling pandemic responses from other factors in the relationship presented a challenge 
to respondents, and thus to analyzing the responses. In addition to logistical and funding 
impediments brought about by the pandemic, COVID-19 is an external event that has further 
shaped the U.S.-China relationship and has had a direct impact on research and programmatic 
opportunities in the field.  
7 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
Each of the 125 organizations we selected received a questionnaire via email with 33 questions divided 
into the following sections: Primary Contact Information, Organizational Information, Impact of COVID-19, 
Focus and Activities, Staff and Budget, Geopolitical Landscape, Successes and Challenges, and 
Organizational Landscape. Some conditional questions became available to respondents based on their 


















































































































































































































































Key Finding 1: Demand for China content is growing in the United States, leading to an increase 
in opportunities for think tanks, programmatic institutions, and academia, along with a shift 
toward more public-facing work in the latter community. 
 
● 40 respondents (48.8 percent) classified public education as a “high priority.”  
● 20 respondents (24.4 percent) cited some form of “growing interest in 
China/Asia” in their response to “What are the biggest opportunities for your 
program in the next few years?”  
● 18 (46.2 percent) of the 39 university and college programs surveyed listed 
“public education” as a high priority.  
 
In recent years, China has risen from a regional player to an important global power. The U.S. 
government and public are struggling to deepen their understanding of the PRC and are 
increasingly looking to China-focused organizations for help in doing so. In response, many 
organizations have modified their activities to meet the increasing demands of public and policy 
audiences.  
 
Some respondents noted that increased alignment between their own research interests and 
the strategic interests of the U.S. government now yield more opportunities for them to 
contribute meaningfully to policy deliberations. One described “significantly greater interest in 
China-related national security issues,” crediting “China’s nationalist politics” for piquing the 
interest of funders and partners.  
 
Several respondents noted that more public and government attention to China has meant 
increases in funding and hiring capacity. Additionally, many said that the remote environment in 
2020 allowed them to reach wider audiences for events and programs than in the past. The 
inability to travel over the past year fortified many organizations’ already-growing reliance on 
digital platforms.  
 
Traditionally, the mandate of colleges and universities is teaching, research, and training 
successor generations of scholars — so their China centers’ activities have been primarily 
intended for internal audiences. However, survey results indicate two trends in this community 
in the last few years: the production of more public-facing content (for both the general public 
and policymakers) and the establishment of semi-independent centers that are more nimble 
than traditional academic departments and can thus publish quickly and frequently, yet have the 
mantle of authority that accompanies academic expertise. Examples include Stanford 
University’s DigiChina, Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 
and the College of William & Mary’s AidData.  
 
Respondents noted that increased attention to the field provides experts the opportunity to help 
shape the narrative. Many have seized the opportunity to brand themselves as China experts — 
attempting to shape U.S.-China policy rather than participate in the much broader field of China 
studies. As one reviewer observed, “There has been a proliferation of self-identified China 
experts, but these are largely people interested in U.S. policy toward China and not providing a 




sides of the U.S.-China relationship and China’s rapid growth offer, as one respondent 
commented, a “once in a generation opportunity” for China specialists to assume the role of 
educators beyond the academy. “China’s dramatic growth,” the same individual continued, 
  
… [forces] us to confront radically changing assumptions and international structures, 
processes, and dynamics which challenge us not only in how we think about China, but 
in how we think about everything from supply chains to human rights, from the 
Thucydides trap to dynamic coexistence, from global divisions of labor to enhanced 
competition, and from the unquestioned status quo of Western dominance of the past 
300 years to the vast technological changes taking place in China. 
 
Others noted that China’s centrality in the foreign policy debate offers experts the opportunity to 
inject interdisciplinary approaches to the study of China. In addition, multiple respondents 
reported increased opportunities to collaborate with scholars and practitioners from a range of 
disciplines.  
 
Key Finding 2: In China, domestic tightening has limited information flows, including access to 
data and the ability to conduct in-country research and interact with Chinese counterparts 
safely and effectively, influencing the topics that can be addressed productively. 
 
● 17 respondents (20.7 percent) commented on difficulties obtaining visas or permission 
to go to the PRC in a scholarly or research capacity.4 
● 17 respondents (20.7 percent) cited lack of access to data and Chinese sources as an 
impediment to their work. 
● 13 respondents (15.9 percent) explicitly cited personal safety concerns as a deterrent to 
traveling to China. 
 
Under President Xi Jinping, China’s political environment has become increasingly restrictive, 
creating intellectual, moral, safety, and logistical impediments for many respondents. 
Developments in Hong Kong (including the June 2020 National Security Law), continuing impact 
and resulting consequences of the 2017 INGO (international nongovernmental organization) law, 
and the overall climate of repression were all reported as specific challenges that pose barriers 
to conducting China-based research for practical reasons and concerns over personal safety. 
These challenges are most salient for the 36 respondents (43.9 percent) who reported 
organizing activities within China as part of their typical operations, but they affect others as 
well.  
 
Many respondents cite an atmosphere of fear in China, which has resulted in a reluctance 
among Chinese nationals to speak openly with individuals representing American and other 
foreign organizations and to do collaborative research or programs. As a result of both Chinese 
counterparts’ hesitation to speak and travel restrictions (visa- and coronavirus-related in both 
directions), U.S.-based researchers can no longer rely on traditional means of gathering 
evidence such as relatively free-flowing conversations, formal interviews, accessing archives, 
and other location-dependent research methods. President Xi’s policies were cited as a specific 
reason for the tightening environment which is stifling traditional methods of data collection 
and research in China. One respondent commented, “We have growing concerns about our 
 
4 This includes instances where visa issues were named specifically, and mentions of related complications 
preventing researchers from traveling to China for research or work, including inability to receive invitation letters, 




ability to carry out our priorities in the face of the manner in which Xi Jinping is governing 
China.”  
 
Beijing’s extralegal detentions of individuals have spurred safety concerns that inhibit some 
respondents’ willingness to conduct in-country research. Several cited the Chinese 
government’s detention of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor as a deterrent to China experts 
visiting the PRC, either out of fear that they, too, could be arbitrarily detained or as a protest 
against the detentions. Increasingly encompassing surveillance worries U.S. scholars 
concerned that their research findings and academic work could lead to political or personal 
safety risks for themselves, their family members, and/or Chinese interlocutors. As one 
respondent wrote, “The domestic Chinese political environment is so unpredictable as to make 
collaboration in China far too problematic to contemplate. We cannot risk detention.” 
   
As a result of the Chinese domestic political environment and the challenges it presents, 
respondents from across the institutions surveyed (universities, think tanks, and NGOs) 
reported an inability to conduct effective Track II dialogues, conferences, and other activities 
within the PRC. Many in the field also expressed an inability to engage in open, productive 
exchanges with Chinese officials and academics — privately or publicly. Even overseas, 
sometimes participation by Chinese interlocutors is seen as an obstacle due to the perception 
that they have to represent the government line. As one respondent wrote, “We also see a 
growing tendency to exclude Chinese scholars from some international fora because they are 
viewed as Beijing spokespeople whose views are known and whose presence stifles dialogue 
between international participants.”  
 
Tightening within China made a wide range of research methods, including data collection, 
interviewing, field work, and archival research, very difficult, and in some cases impossible. As 
restrictions imposed under President Xi have silenced many of their sources,5 researchers are 
less successful in finding individuals who are willing or able to provide context for CCP policies 
and the reality of their implementation. As a result, the Chinese government’s narrative 
dominates.  
 
In tandem, and in some cases as a consequence, the field is increasingly reliant on digitally 
available information that the PRC government releases to the public. These documents and 
datasets comprise only a subset of the whole; as it is in the CCP’s interest to project strength 
and minimize its limitations, the articles, speeches, and documents that the Party is willing to 
provide publicly — and the select documents it translates into English — portray the 
government positively. Given these developments and researchers’ increased dependence on 
digital research, Chinese-language skills (especially reading skills) are becoming more and 
more crucial. As a reviewer noted, “Chinese language ability is going to become more important 
as English-language materials from China lean more toward propaganda and access to experts 
inside China becomes more limited.”  
  
Some respondents reported adapting to the increasingly restrictive political environment in 
China by changing their approach to conducting exchanges. In response to the difficulty of 
conducting collaborative research with Chinese partners, some organizations are focusing on 
simply maintaining existing channels of communication. Many others are looking toward 
digitization. One respondent reported reacting to research impediments by “investing in digital 
scholarship and redoubling commitment to exchanges with all academics engaged in genuine 
 




teaching and research.” Others said that their inability to travel has served to fortify already-
growing reliance on digital platforms and clarified types of digital research opportunities.  
 
But the prioritization of digital research to compensate for a lack of in-person contact comes 
with significant drawbacks. One respondent offered a critique of a methodological approach in 
the field “that favors survey methods and Internet-scraping which provides a better interface 
between the study of Chinese politics and the discipline of political science, but which discounts 
other, more traditional, inductive fieldwork-intensive or archival work.” The same respondent 
wrote that this “niche-driven and micro-level” examination of Chinese politics, fortified by 
institutions’ tenure and promotion criteria, has resulted in the prevalence of limited snapshots 
that fail to explicate the full picture of Chinese politics, and that this trend “will almost certainly 
be further driven by the decreasing level of direct access to Chinese data.” 
 
Key Finding 3: While often in response to specific Chinese actions and policies, the Trump 
administration’s management of the relationship placed American foreign policy institutions 
and individual scholars focused on China in the cross fire, limiting their ability to successfully 
conduct research and programming.  
 
● 54 organizations (65.9 percent) selected “greatly impacted” or “moderately impacted” 
for the question, “To what extent has the United States’ internal or external political 
climate had an impact on your work?” 
● 23 respondents (28 percent) reported visa-related and other travel restrictions imposed 
by the U.S. government as an impediment to their work. 
● All programmatic NGO-affiliated respondents reported that the American political 
landscape affected their work to some degree.  
 
Both U.S. and PRC policies have further compressed organizations’ space to operate 
effectively.6 Visa and travel concerns for U.S. scholars going to China have been described in 
Key Finding 2; meanwhile, the December 2020 announcement of a visa ban on Chinese 
Communist Party members and their families was cited by multiple respondents as detrimental 
to their ability to operate normally. Respondents’ frustration was exacerbated since these 
obstacles to exchange, particularly those propagated by the White House, occurred at a time 
when strengthening American understanding of the range of Chinese thinking has become 
crucial.  
 
More fundamentally, the administration’s combative approach to the relationship influenced 
American news and commentary on China and prompted a focus on confrontation and 
competition. A respondent wrote that some America-based media coverage of China “tends to 
be political and propagandist” rather than based on informed assessments. Respondents also 
described a proliferation of biased or unverified information about China circulating in recent 
years, given added prominence by a variety of factors: social media, the ease with which 
incomplete or unfounded analyses can be shared online, and the Trump administration’s 
perpetuation of false claims about China. These factors combined to intensify experts’ sense of 
obligation to counter the overarching media narrative on China.  
 
 
6 In 2020, the Trump administration suspended the Fulbright program in Hong Kong and China and closed the 
Chinese consulate in Houston, Texas, which Secretary of State Mike Pompeo described as “a hub of stealing and 
intellectual property theft.” Days later, in response, China’s Foreign Ministry announced the closure of the U.S. 




Aggressive U.S. policies during this period were also seen as contributing to a destabilized 
geopolitical landscape. A number of respondents believe that some of these policies, whether 
domestic or foreign, have undermined their work. One described how the administration’s 
approach directly affected the China studies field:  
On the U.S. side, our greatest challenge has been countering the antagonistic and highly 
personal approach which the Trump administration has taken to foreign affairs…. 
Trump’s style and actions have made it difficult to engage with Chinese interlocutors, 
who often feel aggrieved by the latest overstatement from Washington and wish to focus 
on that rather than on long-standing, structural issues in the relationship that would tax 
both sides’ intelligence even if Trump were not president. 
In many ways, American China-focused organizations have been collateral damage of the 
United States’ increasingly polarized debates and policy decisions, and their international 
reputational harm. For example, American organizations, especially those in the advocacy and 
legal spheres, have been affected in recent years by the U.S. government’s inconsistent 
approach to human rights. One respondent wrote that the previous administration’s 
“indifference to human rights principles has somewhat weakened our standing in advocating for 
China's adherence to those principles.” Another echoed this sentiment, writing, “The rise of 
nationalism and populism in the Trump era, along with political polarization, has undermined 
several of the premises of our work: the value of U.S. engagement in multilateral institutions 
and with allies and non-allies alike; the ability to advance bipartisan policy solutions; and, 
frankly, the trustworthiness and credibility of the United States in global affairs.” 
 
Key Finding 4: The downturn in the bilateral relationship has politicized work on China and 
constrained organizations by severely polarizing discussion of China and Sino-American 
relations, resulting in a diminution of the quality of the discourse in both countries.  
 
● 26 respondents (31.7 percent) reported the increasingly polarized U.S. policy and 
rhetoric on China as having a direct negative effect on their work. 
 
Over the last four years, U.S. government officials have found very few areas of bipartisan 
agreement; the need for America to take a harsher stance against China is one of them. At the 
precise time that respondents’ work explaining contemporary China is most essential, there is 
little appetite on the part of the nonexpert community for arguments that deviate from the 
status quo of vilifying China. As a respondent reported, “the toxicity of the current climate has 
led to a debasement of analysis, favoring arguments that are flashy and fear-inducing over 
more sound, rational, long-term thinking that could help the U.S. navigate its way forward in a 
complex, consequential, and inescapable relationship with China.” 
 
U.S.-based China-related organizations’ missions and mandates have been threatened by 
polarization, nationalism, and hostility coming from both sides of the relationship, which in 
some cases pose existential threats to their programs. One respondent wrote that the 
breakdown in communication between the United States and China required “retooling our 
research approaches, recalibrating our student trips, and pushing back on the simplistic 
narrative emerging about China and its global ambitions, while finding our access to Chinese 
counterparts and interlocutors increasingly and unnecessarily curtailed.” Another noted, “The 
worsening of the U.S.-China relationship has politicized this research in ways that I have not 





Constraints on research impede scholars’ ability to understand the overall context of Chinese 
policies. There is a risk that a U.S. consensus based on incomplete assessments will emerge, 
especially regarding the threat posed by Chinese government actions. Although much research 
relies on Chinese-language documents to understand the CCP’s ambitions, according to one 
respondent these analyses sometimes lack “nuance or understanding of how Chinese language 
documents often are in discussion with each other and do not represent a single, authoritative 
view.” Presentations of these documents as indicative of the entirety of China’s plans has, 
according to the same respondent, “led to an over-inflation of the China threat and an under-
appreciation of the significant challenges China will confront in the coming decades.”  
 
Other respondents reported that neutral analyses often seem unwelcome by external 
stakeholders, including American policymakers. Some articulated an increasing difficulty for 
American scholars to discuss China issues without taking a stance, reporting “hostility toward 
even principled engagement with China.” There is a feeling among respondents that balanced 
research on China is “under attack” and in need of defense; one respondent wrote, “polarization 
of the field may pose a daunting challenge to our community.” Another respondent echoed this 
sentiment, writing, “We are a part of the late-20th century wave of globalism, trying to promote 
the better part of globalism during a resurgence of tribalism.”  
 
Polarization in the American discourse has also affected Chinese and Asian-American scholars 
and has led some to fear for their personal safety in the United States. Others were concerned 
about the safety of students amidst the sharp rise in politically fueled racism against Chinese, 
Chinese-Americans, and other Asian-Americans that many partially attribute to increased racist 
rhetoric regarding the coronavirus pandemic used by politicians and public figures since 
February 2020. These concerns were echoed by a respondent who cited xenophobic and anti-
China sentiment in the United States as one reason measured discussion of China has become 
very difficult. Political hawkishness toward China was also described by a respondent as 
problematic for the field, and as one respondent observed, “has been making many China 
scholars cautious and nervous.” The same respondent continued, “These scholars who study 
China or work on U.S.-China issues are afraid that their publications, academic work and 
opinions may attract trouble for them within the U.S. This has been one of the saddest 
developments in recent years.”  
 
Despite the many challenges it presents, polarization has also offered opportunities for those in 
the field to educate government officials and the American public, in the interest of providing a 
balanced perspective. One respondent directly addressed the important role academia and 
China-focused organizations play in this area, writing, “We have potentially a huge role in 
explaining/interpreting/warning a broad public.” Some respondents advocated for expanding 
U.S.-China engagement at the subnational level as a way of circumventing the tensions between 
Beijing and Washington. Another described leading with the data, aiming to make sense of what 
it says on its own rather than proving a preexisting political agenda, adding, “In an increasingly 
combative discourse on China, that commitment is rare and, we hope, makes us a trusted 
resource and reference point across the political and ideological spectrum.”  
 
Key Finding 5: In the current U.S. geopolitical environment, many China-related topics are 
viewed through the lens of security, both within and outside academia. As a result, China has 
been reduced to a target in U.S. domestic rhetoric, rather than a complex subject of 





● Among the 67 respondents (81.7 percent) who labeled research a “high priority,” 30 of 
them (44.8 percent) included China’s military as one of their areas of focus. 
● Among the 10 organizations (12.2 percent) that reported receiving more than 50 percent 
of their funding from the U.S. government, military, security, and human rights issues 
pertaining to China were their primary areas of research and engagement. 
 
Although the notion that China is an adversary is not new, it was solidified by the 2018 
classification of China as a strategic competitor in the National Security Strategy. While China’s 
more aggressive domestic and foreign policies predate the Trump administration,7 many of the 
increasingly assertive actions of President Xi and the CCP leadership in recent years overlapped 
with President Trump’s term in office. These actions largely center on border issues and 
territorial claims, including actions in the South China Sea; ethnically and religiously targeted 
detentions and abuse of Uighurs and other Muslims in Xinjiang; disputes and conflict along the 
China-India border; repression and extralegal detentions in Hong Kong; and increasing military 
activity and threat levels in the Taiwan Strait.  
 
One respondent described how bipartisan hawkishness on China during this period has affected 
the field: 
 
Hard-line views in Congress and the instinct to try to counter every egregious Chinese 
act with American legislation — much of which is useless or counterproductive — has 
also made our task more difficult, as many legislators seem to think that any attempt to 
bring complexity to discussions of U.S.-China relations stems from a soft hand or a soft 
head. Expertise is often viewed as blinkered or gullible.  
 
This security-focused interpretation of China’s actions, however, has not been entirely negative 
as it has identified genuinely understudied threats and brought new specialists to the field. One 
respondent commented, “We have a number of national security professionals and faculty 
whose work increasingly involves aspects of China policy by virtue of China’s growing emphasis 
in U.S. national security considerations and strategy.”  
 
There is a fear, however, that security considerations now overshadow other areas of research. 
As one respondent noted, “The security community’s approach to U.S.-China relations now 
dominates the conversation, blinding both sides to the full potential of relations and to 
possibilities for cooperation and co-evolution.” Excessively prioritizing security and pouring a lot 
of money into security-related areas,8 paradoxically, may create a self-fulfilling prophecy 
wherein threat is the only lens through which each country assesses the other. Despite real 
concerns posed by the CCP’s actions, respondents fear a narrow focus on China’s role as a 
competitor reduces it to a target, rather than a complex subject of multidisciplinary study.  
 
Some respondents feel the Trump administration responded too narrowly to China’s external 
political, espionage, and influence activities. The administration’s inattention to nontraditional 
security threats present in the relationship and its excessive attention to maintaining American 
hard power preeminence in Asia only address one part of the problem. A reviewer pointed out 
that the majority view within the American foreign policy community is that a more diverse and 
 
7 This was reflected in President Obama’s “pivot to Asia” policy and subsequent policies. 
8 As one respondent wrote, “I think we need to watch the flood of potential DOD funding and [the] distorting effect it 





dynamic foreign policy tool kit is needed, and military action should be avoided at all costs. One 
respondent explained that the field lacks adequate consideration of nonmilitary forms of crisis 
prevention and alternatives to American military dominance in the region, calling this a 
byproduct of 20th-century ideological and military competition, and groupthink regarding a 
long-term security strategy in Asia. 
 
On the other hand, some organizations have both supported and benefited from the China field’s 
tilt toward security. One respondent wrote, “Intensifying concern in the U.S. about strategic 
competition with China, malign foreign influence, and strengthening democratic resilience in 
partnership with allies has been a boon to our work.” Despite this increased attention to 
security and competition, there remains a dearth of thorough and detailed research on China’s 
military; as one reviewer wrote, “Even in think-tanks, there are few ‘PLA watchers’ (though 
perhaps many PLA commentators) who use Chinese sources to understand the PLA. As China 
now spends more on defense than any country other than the United States, more work is 
needed on these issues from academics.” 
 
Increased attention on China as a security threat has resulted in the outsized influence of 
countless new so-called “China experts”; as one respondent wrote, “Many experts from a 
variety of fields now have influence on China policy, but not all have actually studied China.” 
Without a strong foundation of language study and extended time in the field, these experts can 
speak to pertinent topics within their areas, but may lack in-depth understanding of China. As a 
reviewer said, “Everyone is a China expert these days. Or wants to be.” The rise of these voices 
has added to the “chorus” of experts focused on China’s role as a security threat to the United 








As noted in Key Finding 1, opportunities have increased as interest in China has expanded, 
generally providing more fodder for organizations old and new to rethink their work. Issues of 
relevance to the U.S.-China relationship now include areas that were previously seen as niche 
subfields, such as China’s domestic economic and technology policies, expanding the security 
field beyond China’s foreign policy, military-to-military relations, and strategic outlook. New 
organizations have cropped up to address the need for deeper research, publication, and policy 
guidance on these topics.  
 
In the past decade, new organizations were also created to address challenges posed by the 
American political environment. The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, for example, 
was established in 2019 with support from prominent funders on the American political left and 
right in order to promote the view that foreign policy issues should be oriented toward 
diplomatic solutions rather than conflict. The Black China Caucus, established in 2020, aims to 
diversify the field and promote the voices of experts among people of color; it attributes its 
significant growth to the Black Lives Matter protests that took place in 2020. 
 
Established organizations cited ongoing efforts to adapt their practices by producing more 
policy-relevant work, increasing public programs, and/or reworking strategic plans to account 
for the new context. Many university-based China centers expanded their scope beyond internal 
on-campus audiences to inform the general public and policymakers.  
 
In general, organizations have found ways to collaborate and coordinate with Chinese 
colleagues and counterpart organizations despite the logistical and political obstacles present 
in those endeavors. It should not be a surprise, however, that those that reported the most 
success in doing so are in the climate and energy fields (areas where China has made public 
declarations of its intent to cooperate) and those working specifically on technical issues.  
 
Methodological and other approaches listed below constitute the primary types of successes 
reported by respondents:  
 
● Nuanced and nonpoliticized publishing and research on China, contributing in a neutral 
way to the discourse, producing policy-oriented work that is based on a deep 
understanding of China 
● Working with Chinese counterparts on specific, practical projects, especially on 
environmental issues 
● Emphasizing data-driven research approaches9  
● Dialogues and exchanges — while growing increasingly difficult to run productively, 




9 One respondent described developing a program that publishes “field-altering research that quantifies difficult-to-
measure concepts such as China’s public diplomacy toolkit” and is “on the frontline of producing new insights in 






Responses elucidate a continuing concern about the narrowing pipeline of younger scholars 
who are comprehensively trained, and who can continue the work of older cohorts, some of 
whom are retiring or will be in the coming few years. Others fear that the climate in China will 
deter new scholars from entering the field and replenishing the pipeline.10 One reviewer’s 
comment represents that of several: “I suspect that the political climate in China . . . will not 
improve that trend, but probably exacerbate it and make it worse.”  
 
Multiple respondents brought up diversity as an issue in the China studies field. One respondent 
summed it up:  
 
The field lacks diversity in the extreme, which not only limits opportunities for a wide 
range of potential future leaders, but also narrows the ideological spectrum of the field 
and impedes creative thinking. Organizations that promote expert opinion must broaden 
their definition of “expert” to ensure they continue to inject fresh thinking into the field of 
China’s relations with the rest of the world. We shouldn’t be surprised that this area of 
study was susceptible to groupthink, and we should quickly appreciate that the solution 
to this problem isn’t a unified pivot towards a new consensus, but rather to evolve the 
system so that it includes a wider range of ideas and voices. 
 
Several respondents expressed concern about the future of the China field beyond the pipeline 
issue. Given the context of increased tightening in China, there continues to be debate regarding 
how research approaches and methodologies can or should be altered. Specific issues such as 
the Chinese government’s handling of minority politics and international diplomacy have 
become increasingly securitized in the U.S.-China relationship, which some respondents believe 
has underscored the need for improved basic research in these areas. One reviewer called for 
increased funding for long-term qualitative research to answer questions such as “what exactly 
is China doing, where, and to what extent is that behavior indicative of change or continuity from 
the past?”  
 
Achieving this counterbalance is increasingly important as professional incentives and 
geopolitical challenges push the field further in the other direction and may hold existential 
challenges to its legitimacy. One respondent noted that in the United States, “The field of China 
studies and U.S.-China relations is no longer the best in the world, it has significantly 
deteriorated in the past decade. It will lose its credibility in general unless we make strong 
efforts to correct its dogmatism and self-indulgence.”  
 
A few institutions found the increased interest in China and their success in responding to it had 
brought with it sufficient attention to make fundraising easier than in the past. However, in 
general, financial constraints permeate the field. American political and popular attitudes 
toward China have negatively affected the type and degree of funding available to most of the 
surveyed organizations. Several reported simultaneously confronting increases in the demand 
for China-related research and the financial inability to hire accordingly. Others found that an 
ease in fundraising at times comes with strings attached. One respondent wrote, “I am very 
concerned about the extent of U.S. government funding going into certain research niches on 
China that have not typically been heavily government funded and tend to produce negative 
exposé reports.” Others emphasized that unbiased funding deliberations are made by only a 
 




handful of foundations and expressed concern that looking for funding beyond this small group 
can be troubling since both the corporate world and the U.S. government, not to mention 
foreign governments, have their own agendas.   
 
Research Gaps   
 
The survey asked respondents to identify major gaps in research or programmatic work in 
China-focused foreign policy organizations. Some of the gaps, such as China’s international 
engagement, conflict avoidance, and relationships with third countries, are not new. However, 
there is a noticeable expansion from similar surveys conducted in the past in the range of 
relevant issues. Categories of research gaps mentioned by respondents are listed in 
alphabetical order below:  
 
Category  Gaps in Research  
China’s International Economic Engagement  
 
- China’s continuing trade expansion 
- U.S.-China economic interdependence 
and how it contributes to American 
and Chinese interests and the stability 
of the global economy 
- China’s use of economic engagement 
as potential leverage in other arenas 
China’s Relations with Countries Other Than 
the United States 
 
- China’s relationships with Russia and 
India 
- China’s relations with Latin America 
and Africa, including its 20-year 
history of intensifying relations in 
Africa and implications for U.S. 
interests 
Document Access - Ability to access original Chinese 
documents, articles, commentary, and 
speeches 
- Open-source translations of these 
documents 
Emerging Technologies  
 
- Artificial intelligence and 
cybersecurity 
- Chinese science and technology policy 
- Technological decoupling 
- Technology governance and standard-
setting 
- Biotechnology and biomedical security 
- China’s technological prowess in 
terms of both domestic power 
structures and global power relations  
- How major tech companies constitute 
enormous nonstate power centers in 




- Power dynamics between individuals 
and companies and between 
companies and governments 
Nontraditional Security Studies  - Environmental security, public health, 
and human rights issues across the 
board  
- China’s 2060 carbon neutral goal 
- A realistic plan for constructive 
competition within the U.S.-China 
climate relationship 
- Human rights work across a variety of 
fields (global economics, international 
relations, climate change)11  
- Centrality of climate change in peace 
and security and international 
relations 
- Management of the U.S.-China 
relationship in the context of the 
shared existential threat of climate 
change 
Understanding Chinese Domestic Politics - China’s efforts to “export” its model 




Needs of the Field12  
 
Respondents also identified methodological areas and research approaches that they believe 
are insufficiently represented in the China studies field.  
 
Access: The inaccessibility of interview subjects and other Chinese interlocutors, increasing 
logistical difficulties to conducting field work, and closing of archives to scholars were reported 
as impediments to effective research in the current political environment. Also mentioned is the 
fact that insufficient attention is paid to the work of Chinese scholars based in China.  
 
Chinese Ethnic Minority Studies: Respondents described problems in both the quantity and 
quality of research related to religious and ethnic minority affairs in China, an area one 
respondent called “marginalized.” A stronger grasp of Chinese minority politics, institutions, 
and languages as well as more nuance regarding the Chinese government’s attitudes toward 
minority affairs is needed among many who write on the subject.  
 
 
11 One respondent described the elevation of human rights in geopolitical concerns this way: “The international 
developments and shifting views among diverse stakeholders regarding the importance of the human rights 
perspective and normative tools [presents an opportunity], as the inclusion of human rights work in this survey 
reflects.”  




Diplomacy “as a tool of statecraft”: Chinese diplomacy, according to one respondent, is 
currently insufficiently studied as its own subject of inquiry. This area would include how China 
engages with countries around the world and how they respond to China’s approach. As one 
reviewer wrote, China’s diplomacy “is often simply subsumed under the idea that China has 
been more assertive without actually unpacking how China practices the art of diplomacy, to 
include how it bargains/negotiates with other countries, how it structures its foreign relations 
bilaterally and multilaterally, regionally and globally, [and] the ideas behind its diplomacy.” 
 
Educating Non-China Specialists: One reviewer wrote, “I believe the field now also needs to 
think carefully about how to provide training on analyzing and interpreting China to 
security/conflict scholars who will not become full Sinologists, but whose work will definitely 
shape China policy and U.S.-China relations.”  
 
Managing Risk: There is a clear need for researchers, especially those conducting field work, to 
acquire a personal and professional risk tool kit that would include practices similar to those 
adopted by researchers who have faced similar challenges in different geographic regions.13 
 
“Return to Sinology”: Respondents expressed the necessity of strengthening area studies 
expertise and language skills in general, and specifically, to interpret Chinese documents in 
their appropriate political context, and to reflect complex political realities in China such as the 
competing interests of various factions within the Party.  
 
Translation: Open-source translations14 of Chinese documents, expanding from technical 
translations (the field’s primary area of translation success), and offering a wider sampling of 
more general political translations, was cited by respondents as an area in need of expansion 





13 Contemporary best practices could be adopted from scholars focused on the Middle East, or historic examples may 
be found in the study of the USSR. 
14 Websites such as NPC Observer, Reading the China Dream, and China Law Translate are noteworthy projects 






As China’s domestic and foreign policies continue to attract widespread attention among 
Americans, respondents emphasized the importance of keeping the discourse fact-based, 
rational, and productive. To achieve this end, it is crucial that China scholars help experts from 
other fields better understand China; by the same token, scholars and practitioners from other 
fields can strengthen China experts’ grasp of other research areas. According to a reviewer, 
“The broadening of China conflict/security work beyond people whose primary training focuses 
on China is a challenge — because it could lead to flawed analysis. But it also presents an 
opportunity for funders and educators: there is a whole new set of people who could benefit 
from learning how to study China well.”  
 
Immense uncertainty characterized the survey findings in this report. COVID-19 and political 
unknowns on both sides of the Pacific made it impossible for many organizations to conduct 
business as usual in 2020. While the unpredictability faced by respondents has been described 
elsewhere in this report, it bears repeating due to the dominant role it played in their 
assessments. Survey results also strongly reflect increased attention to China throughout 
American government and society and the resulting impact — positive and negative — this 
attention had on the field.  
 
Multiple respondents indicated their frustration at the difficulty of hearing directly from Chinese 
interlocutors, thus rendering nuanced discourse extremely difficult. This has been exacerbated 
by the fact that the Chinese government has expelled many foreign correspondents who 
previously conveyed some of those voices through their reporting.  
 
It is clear the field has shifted markedly since NCUSCR last surveyed American organizations 
focused on China and peace and security studies nearly 10 years ago: experts in advanced 
technologies (as they relate to China from political, economic, and security perspectives) have 
emerged; risk and safety have now become significant features of the field; concerns over lack 
of cross-pollination within the field have been overshadowed by fear of groupthink; and many 
agree that there is now a more intense focus on strategic and security-related issues in 
studying China.  
 
While respondents did not expect a significant shift in U.S. policy toward China under the new 
administration, many speculated that President Biden would likely approach the relationship 
with a more consistent and less hostile tone. They were hopeful that such a change might allow 
for more opportunities for multilateral coordination on China and a resumption of people-to-
people exchanges. The ways in which the political environment within China — and potential 
research opportunities — may develop remain to be seen.  
 
Whatever the new administration’s policies may be, survey results demonstrated respondents’ 
alarm at the burgeoning gulf between the two countries and how this divergence will continue 
to stifle research and exchange. These fears were compounded by the fast-closing windows for 
exchange that came as collateral damage of the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite these challenges, 
respondents made it clear that they anticipate that the role and relevance of research on many 







List of Organizations That Responded to the Survey 
 
 Institutions  Program Name (if applicable) 
1 American Friends Service Committee  East Asia Quaker International Affairs Program 
2 Asia Society Asia Society Policy Institute 
3 Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations 
4 Black China Caucus  
5 Boston University Global Development Policy Center 
6 Brookings Institution John L. Thornton China Center 
7 Brookings Institution Center for East Asia Policy Studies 
8 Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs 
9 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy 
10 Carter Center China Program 
11 Center for a New American Security Energy, Economics, and Security Program 
12 Center for a New American Security  Asia-Pacific Security Program  
13 Center for Advanced China Research  
14 Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) Counter-Proliferation Program 
15 Center for Global Development  
16 Center for International Maritime Security  
17 Center for Strategic and International Studies China Power Project 
18 Center for Strategic and International Studies Economics Program 
19 Center for Strategic and International Studies Freeman Chair in China Studies 
20 Center for Strategic and International Studies Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics 
21 CNA Corporation China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs  
22 College of William & Mary, Global Research Institute  AidData 
23 Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy 
24 Columbia University Columbia Law School 
25 
Columbia University, School of International and Public 
Affairs (SIPA) Columbia-Harvard China and the World Program 
26 Cornell University 
The Brittany and Adam J. Levinson China and Asia-Pacific 
Studies Program (CAPS) 
27 Council on Foreign Relations Global Health Program 
28 Council on Foreign Relations 
Ira A. Lipman Chair in Emerging Technologies and 
National Security; Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program 
29 Duke University  
30 EastWest Institute East Asia Program 
31 Foreign Policy Research Institute Foreign Policy Research Institute (Asia Program) 
32 Freedom House China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan Research 
33 George H.W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations  
34 Georgetown University Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) 
35 The George Washington University 
Tibet GovLab and Research Initiative on Multination States 
(RIMS) 





The George Washington University, Elliott School of 
International Affairs China Policy Program  
38 Harvard Kennedy School Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation 
39 Harvard University Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies 
40 Harvard University Harvard Law School 
41 Hoover Institution China’s Global Sharp Power Project 
42 Human Rights in China  
43 Inter-American Dialogue Asia & Latin America Program 
44 
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced 
International Studies (SAIS) China Studies Program and SAIS China 
45 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for 
International Studies Security Studies Program 
46 The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation  
47 The National Bureau of Asian Research  
48 National Committee on American Foreign Policy Forum on Asia-Pacific Security 
49 National Committee on U.S.-China Relations  
50 National Defense University INSS Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs 
51 National Defense University INSS Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
52 Natural Resources Defense Council China Program 
53 Naval Postgraduate School Department of National Security Affairs 
54 New York University School of Law U.S.-Asia Law Institute 
55 Paulson Institute MacroPolo 
56 Peterson Institute for International Economics  
57 Princeton University Paul and Marcia Wythes Center on Contemporary China 
58 Project 2049 Institute  
59 Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft East Asia Program  
60 Seton Hall University Center for Peace and Conflict Studies 
61 
Stanford University, Freeman Spogli Institute for 
International Studies Center for International Security and Cooperation 
62 
Stanford University, Freeman Spogli Institute for 
International Studies DigiChina 
63 
Stanford University, Freeman Spogli Institute for 
International Studies 
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 
Stanford China Program 
64 Stimson Center  China Program 
65 United States Institute of Peace China Program 
66 University of California, Berkeley California-China Climate Institute 
67 University of California San Diego 21st Century China Center 
68 University of California San Diego Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation 
69 University of California San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy 
70 University of Denver Center for China-U.S. Cooperation 
71 University of Maryland, Center for Global Sustainability China Program 
72 University of Michigan, International Institute Lieberthal-Rogel Center for Chinese Studies 
73 University of Montana Maureen and Mike Mansfield Center 
74 University of Oklahoma, College of International Studies  Institute for US-China Issues 
75 University of Pennsylvania Center for the Study of Contemporary China 
76 
University of Texas at Austin, Clements Center for 
National Security and the Robert Strauss Center for 
International Security and Law Clements-Strauss Asia Policy Initiative 





University of Washington, Henry M. Jackson School of 
International Studies China Studies Program 
79 U.S. Air Force China Aerospace Studies Institute 
80 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Asia Program 
81 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars  Kissinger Institute on China and the United States 
82 World Resources Institute Climate Program 
 
 
 
